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Urban Research Institute Ghana

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Policy Discussion Paper  •  Urban Research Institute  •  August 2026

Summary

Ghana’s housing stock is expanding faster than it is being made safe. Roughly 90 per cent of the 6.1 million housing units added between 2000 and 2021 were built outside any formal mortgage program (Ghana Statistical Service, 2024), much of it on floodplains and drainage corridors, against a national deficit of 1.8–2 million units (Centre for Affordable Housing Finance in Africa [CAHF], 2024). Flooding already affects an estimated 45,000 Ghanaians annually, and the World Bank warns that without stronger adaptation measures, at least one million more Ghanaians could fall into poverty due to climate shocks by 2050 (World Bank Group, 2022). This paper argues that the drivers of this exposure — constrained construction finance, an inaccessible mortgage market, weak code enforcement, and fragmented disaster-response institutions — are interconnected, and it recommends a sequenced package of regulatory, financial, and institutional reforms built around the agencies Ghana already has.

1. The Problem

Ghana’s urban population has grown from under four million in 1990 to roughly 19 million today, with secondary cities such as Tamale and Techiman now growing faster than Accra or Kumasi (World Bank, 2025). Formal housing supply has not kept pace: the World Bank estimates the annual need at 70,000–133,000 units, while formal delivery covers roughly a third of that need (CAHF, 2024). The resulting informal, incremental construction has expanded onto wetlands and natural drainage corridors, intensifying flood severity in Accra and beyond. Climate change compounds this exposure directly: half of Ghana’s coastline is vulnerable to erosion and sea-level rise, and a resilient development pathway could instead generate more than US$26 billion in economic benefit by 2040 (World Bank Group, 2022). Poor housing quality is also a distinct dimension of poverty: a composite index applied to census data finds 56.5 per cent of Ghanaian households ‘housing poor’, with a sharp urban–rural divide (allAfrica.com, 2026). Climate-resilient housing therefore bears directly on Ghana’s commitments under SDG 11 and its Nationally Determined Contributions, which identify the built environment as a priority adaptation sector.

2. What the Evidence Shows

Four findings from the research literature frame this paper’s recommendations. First, construction financing is a binding constraint on supply. A survey of 400 Ghanaian small and medium construction firms (SMCFs) — which build most of the country’s housing — found that overdraft facilities, supplier credit, and loans from relatives were the dominant sources of finance, well ahead of structured bank lending (Eyiah & Bondinuba, 2020), consistent with World Bank enterprise-survey evidence of an MSME financing gap of roughly 13 per cent of GDP (World Bank, 2020). Second, conventional mortgage finance does not reach the households most exposed to climate risk. Housing microfinance (HMF) is a practical alternative for low-income groups, but HMF providers themselves struggle to access long-term capital, highlighting the need to reposition Ghana’s Microfinance and Small Loans Centre (MASLOC) as a source of liquidity refinancing (Bondinuba, 2016; Bondinuba et al., 2016).

Third, emergency-response systems remain under-resourced. A systematic review of 30 peer-reviewed studies (2015–2025) identifies 15 recurring challenges to disaster preparedness, including resource constraints, weak inter-agency coordination, and limited community engagement, with marginalised communities disproportionately affected (Abudu et al., 2025).

Fourth, program design matters as much as program content. Structural equation modelling of 213 Ghanaian construction stakeholders finds that engagement models improve project success only indirectly, through the collaborative advantage they generate among clients, contractors, and communities (Bondinuba et al., 2025). Related evidence on building envelope design confirms that orientation, materials, and fenestration meaningfully affect thermal performance in hot climates (El Bakkush, Bondinuba and Harris, 2015), and that treating thermal comfort and indoor air quality as design priorities yields measurable health benefits (Opoku et al., 2024); Ghana-specific research on passive cooling nonetheless remains thin and is flagged here as a priority research gap rather than assumed.

3. Core Policy Challenges

  • Institutional fragmentation: housing, planning, and disaster management are split across the Ministry of Works and Housing, the Land Use and Spatial Planning Authority, MMDAs, and NADMO, hindering catchment-scale flood management that, by nature, crosses assembly boundaries.
  • Weak enforcement: the National Building Regulations (L.I. 1630, 1996) and the 2018 Ghana Building Code set adequate technical standards, but a global review finds persistent gaps in resilience provisions and compliance mechanisms (World Bank, 2026).
  • Financing gaps at both firm and household levels, worsened by 22.8 per cent inflation and 27.8 per cent currency depreciation in 2023–24, have raised the cost of imported cement and steel (CAHF, 2024).
  • Limited MMDA technical capacity for flood-risk screening and permit enforcement, and infrastructure deficits, illustrated by the US$200 million Greater Accra Resilient Integrated Development Project in the Odaw River basin — a scale of investment that remains the exception (Africa Policy Research Institute, 2024).
  • Unequal exposure: roughly 45 per cent of Ghana’s urban population lives in slums or slum-like conditions, concentrated in the settlements least able to finance resilient retrofitting.

4. Policy Options

Four broad approaches are available, and each is necessary but insufficient on its own. Regulation-led action — enforcing the Building Code with mandatory flood-risk screening — directly addresses siting risk at low fiscal cost, but without complementary finance, it risks pushing construction further into informality. Finance-led action — a housing-microfinance guarantee facility and an SME credit line — targets the binding constraints identified above but creates contingent fiscal exposure and risks captured by larger firms unless deliberately targeted. Settlement upgrading — drainage improvement, retrofitting grants, and tenure regularisation in existing informal areas — reaches the households shown to be most exposed, but is capital-intensive and politically sensitive where it touches relocation. Institution-led reform — strengthening inter-agency coordination and municipal capacity — is the slowest to show results but underpins the effectiveness of the other three.

5. Recommended Policy Package

  • National government: issue flood-risk screening guidance under L.I. 1630 as a condition of permit approval in high-risk zones; capitalise an HMF guarantee facility through a repositioned MASLOC (Bondinuba et al., 2016); establish a construction-SME credit line targeted at firms adopting resilient techniques (Eyiah & Bondinuba, 2020).
  • MMDAs: build GIS-based flood-risk mapping capacity in the highest-incidence districts; strengthen permit-inspection capacity with a defined enforcement pathway (retrofit grants before demolition); formalise inter-assembly coordination for shared drainage catchments.
  • Private sector: link supplier credit and bank lending to code-compliant construction; professional bodies to provide low-cost technical advice to small contractors on passive cooling and resilient siting.
  • Development partners: expand co-financed settlement upgrading on the model of the Odaw River project, with an explicit retrofit component; support technical assistance for flood-risk mapping.
  • Research institutions: prioritise Ghana-specific research on passive cooling and locally available resilient materials; undertake longitudinal evaluation of stakeholder-engagement models in resilience programs (Bondinuba et al., 2025).

6. Implementation Priorities and Principal Risks

PhasePriority actionLead institutionMonitoring indicator
Years 1–2Flood-risk screening guidance; capitalise HMF guarantee facility; pilot GIS mapping in 5 highest-risk MMDAsMinistry of Works and Housing; MASLOCGuidance issued; facility operational; districts mapped
Years 3–5National roll-out of SME credit line; settlement-upgrading pilots in 3 flood-prone areasMinistry of Finance; Ministry of Works and HousingLoans disbursed; households upgraded; flood-incident reduction
Years 5–10National scale-up of resilient retrofitting; full enforcement of climate-resilient building standardsMinistry of Works and Housing; all MMDAsHousing-poverty index trend; permit-stage compliance rate

The principal risks are fiscal (contingent liabilities from the guarantee facility, mitigated by capped, phased exposure and a development-partner co-guarantee), political (resistance to stricter enforcement, mitigated by phasing in compliance alongside access to finance), and institutional (fragmented mandates, mitigated by a standing inter-agency coordination committee). Community resistance to relocation is best addressed by prioritising in-situ upgrading over resettlement and by applying structured, collaborative engagement models that have been shown to improve project outcomes (Bondinuba et al., 2025).

7. Conclusion

Ghana’s housing challenge is not simply a shortage of units; it is a system in which the firms and households that build most of the country’s homes are financed informally, existing standards are inconsistently enforced, and the institutions responsible for planning, finance, and disaster response operate with limited coordination. These are not separate problems, and no single lever — regulation, finance, upgrading, or institutional reform — resolves them alone. The package recommended here is deliberately sequenced and built around institutions Ghana already has. Its success will depend on sustained political commitment across budget cycles and genuine engagement with the communities and small contractors who will build and live in this housing — so that each rainy season is treated not as an isolated emergency, but as a predictable test of policy choices made years earlier.

References

Abudu, H.D., Mewomo, C.M., Adjei, K.O. & Bondinuba, F.K. (2025). ‘Challenges in emergency response infrastructure: a systematic literature review’, Journal of Civil Engineering, Science and Technology, 16(2), pp. 269–279. https://doi.org/10.33736/jcest.8972.2025

Africa Policy Research Institute (APRI) (2024). Climate Change Adaptation in Ghana: Strategies, Initiatives, and Practices. Berlin: APRI. Available at: afripoli.org (Accessed: 14 August 2026).

allAfrica.com (2026) ‘Ghana’s housing problem goes beyond numbers — it’s also about quality’, allAfrica.com, August. Available at: allafrica.com (Accessed: 14 August 2026).

Arwadi, Y., Torku, A., Tetteh, M. O., & Bondinuba, F. K. (2025). Strategies to optimise project management implementation in the delivery of renewable energy projects in Indonesia. Buildings, 15(7), 1049.

Bondinuba, F.K. (2016). The role of microfinance as an innovative strategy for low-income housing delivery in developing countries. Doctoral dissertation. Heriot-Watt University.

Bondinuba, F.K., Bondinuba, N., Mewomo, C.M., Camynta-Baezie, G. & Abudu, H.D. (2025). ‘Building collaborative advantage: exploring innovative stakeholder engagement models for construction project success’, International Journal of Construction Management, 25(16), pp. 1879–1891. https://doi.org/10.1080/15623599.2025.2488922

Bondinuba, F.K., Karley, N.K., Biitir, S.B. & Adjei-Twum, A. (2016). ‘Assessing the role of housing microfinance in the low-income housing market in Ghana’, Journal of Poverty, Investment and Development, 28, pp. 44–54.

Centre for Affordable Housing Finance in Africa (CAHF) (2024). Ghana: Housing Finance Yearbook 2024. Johannesburg: CAHF. Available at: housingfinanceafrica.org (Accessed: 14 August 2026).

El Bakkush, A.F., Bondinuba, F.K. & Harris, D.J. (2015). ‘The effect of outdoor air temperature on the thermal performance of a residential building’, Journal of Multidisciplinary Engineering Science and Technology, 2(9), pp. 2563–2570.

Eyiah, A.K. & Bondinuba, F.K. (2020). ‘Financing practices and preference of small and medium construction firms in Ghana’, International Journal of Small and Medium Enterprises and Business Sustainability, 5(1), pp. 36–60.

Ghana Statistical Service (2024). 2021 Population and Housing Census: General Report Series. Accra: Ghana Statistical Service. Available at: statsghana.gov.gh (Accessed: 14 August 2026).

Opoku, A., Bondinuba, F. K., Manaphraim, N. Y. B., & Kugblenu, G. (2024). Advancing the sustainable development goals through the promotion of health and well-being in the built environment. In The Elgar Companion to the Built Environment and the Sustainable Development Goals (pp. 137–157). Edward Elgar Publishing.

World Bank (2020). Improving Access to Finance for Ghanaian SMEs: The Role of a New Development Finance Institution. Washington, DC: World Bank.

World Bank (2025). A Sustainable Cities Strategy for Ghana. Washington, DC: World Bank.

World Bank (2026). Stronger Building Codes for a Safer, More Resilient Future. Washington, DC: World Bank. Available at: worldbank.org (Accessed: 14 August 2026).

World Bank Group (2022). Ghana Country Climate and Development Report. Washington, DC: World Bank Group. Available at: worldbank.org (Accessed: 14 August 2026).

5 Responses

    1. Politics is likely to be a bigger determinant of whether this framework survives implementation than any of its technical design choices — and a few current developments make that risk fairly concrete rather than abstract.

      Electoral cycle mismatch is the structural risk. The framework’s own phasing (Years 1–2, 3–5, 5–10) spans at least two, likely three, Ghanaian election cycles. Ghana’s housing-policy literature documents a recurring pattern where incoming administrations shelve or rebrand predecessor projects rather than continue them for political expediency — the framework already sits on evidence of this pattern (the Adenta State Housing project stalled for a decade partly over legal and political friction before recent efforts to revive it). A ten-year resilience program that depends on sustained enforcement discipline is structurally vulnerable to a change of minister, let alone a change of government.

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